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Previous work has shown a pattern of lower household incomes for those Paraguayan farms with 
female landowners in the household. The study of agricultural production reveals that 
Paraguayan women specialize in livestock and dairy production, while men specialize in crop 
production. An analysis of crop specialization and crop yields finds no significant differences in 
yields among households along gender lines, although women appear to specialize in food crops. 
Finally, households with female land rights have markedly lower rates of return on agricultural 
production. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is an assessment of the impact of women’s land rights on agricultural productivity in 
rural Paraguay. This study takes a step beyond the comparative work done by Carmen Diana 
Deere, Rosa Luz Durán, Merrilee Mardon, and myself on Brazil, Peru, and Paraguay (Deere et 
al., 2005). In that report, we found that households with female land rights had higher net 
nonagricultural incomes, but lower net agricultural and net household incomes. This article, then, 
is an attempt to explain lower agricultural incomes in households with female land rights. I will 
do this by investigating differences in crop yields, crop specialization, and farm activity 
specialization by owner-operated rural farms with and without female land rights. 
  As Agarwal (1994), and Deere and León (2001) have argued, land rights for women are 
key determinants in women’s and household welfare in rural settings throughout the developing 
world. Agarwal, studying the issue in South Asia, defines women’s land rights as comprising 
ownership of and independent control over land. She puts forth four main arguments for 
women’s land rights. First, that women’s land rights lead to improved welfare for women and for 
children. This is due to the systematic bias towards men in intrahousehold resource allocation, 
the fact that resources under women’s control are used more towards household (especially 
children’s) needs than those under men’s control, and the increasing portion of households 
headed by women alone. Since land is such an important economic resource, women’s land 
rights will improve welfare. Second, women’s land rights lead to increased productivity. This 
increase comes about because titled land is useful as a means of securing credit and other inputs, 
and provides a greater incentive to make efficiency-enhancing improvements. So ownership with 
secure title will increase the efficiency of female farmers. It may also increase overall efficiency, 
due to the indirect effects of the first point (better overall household welfare may increase 
productivity). Third, women’s land rights increase equality for women relative to men in the 
household and the community. And fourth, women’s land rights empower women by giving 
them an economic base from which to challenge gender oppression in the household and society 
at large. 
  While Agarwal addresses these issues in the context of South Asia, Deere and León’s 
focus is on Latin America, tracing the effects of the women’s movement and neoliberal policies 
on women’s land rights. They expand Agarwal’s four main points in the Latin American case.   3
Their research reveals that, while substantial progress has been made towards de jure gender 
equality, de facto gender equality with respect to the distribution of property remains elusive. 
Many countries in the region have instituted legal reforms that have strengthened married 
women’s land rights. However, the actual mechanisms for distributing land have not changed 
sufficiently and, as a result, the distribution of assets, especially land, in the region as a whole 
remains largely skewed towards men. While Agarwal makes the case that independent title to 
land is crucial for the South Asian case, Deere and León (2001) argue that, currently in Latin 
America, joint titling will be the most effective means of increasing women’s land rights. This is 
due to a combination of factors unique to current land reform efforts in the Latin American 
context. First, since family farming predominates, land tends to be distributed to household 
heads, usually men. Second, rather than distributing land, governments are titling land as the 
means of creating a well-functioning land market in order to foment economic growth and 
efficiency in the agricultural sector. In this institutional context, joint titling is currently the most 
reliable means to ensure that women as well as men enjoy rights to land. 
  Thus far, little empirical work has been done on the impact of women’s land rights on 
outcomes in rural Latin America. A growing body of studies elsewhere (especially in Africa) has 
focused on the effects of women’s land rights on agricultural production and women’s welfare in 
rural areas. Some of the themes uniting this literature are the attempt to model and measure 
household agricultural production, the examination of the effects of societal gender 
discrimination on female-headed rural households, and the effects of gender discrimination 
within rural households on agricultural production. This study builds upon the study of gender 
and land rights in Paraguay, Peru, and Brazil undertaken by Deere, Durán, Mardon, and myself 
for the World Bank (Deere et al. 2005). We found that in Peru, net household and nonfarm 
income were significantly
1 higher, and net farm income was lower in households with female 
land rights. In Paraguay, while households with female land rights also had significantly higher 
net nonfarm incomes, they had lower net household incomes and significantly lower net farm 
incomes. Is this evidence that Agarwal’s assessment of female land rights is in error? Not 
necessarily. Our measure of female land rights is really a measure of female land ownership. In 
the Paraguayan Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data set, no information is 
                                                 
1 A clarification: From this point forward, significant will mean statistically significant at least at the 10% confidence level both 
for testing of differences of means among categories and for testing of coefficients in regression estimations.   4
available about direct control over land. Since this is only one part of Agarwal’s definition of 
effective rights, these results may in fact support Agarwal’s point that control over land, as 
opposed to simple ownership, is vital. 
  In Paraguay, women have land rights in only 12% of rural owner-operated farms (Table 
1). Even those households with female land rights are at a disadvantage compared to the rest of 
households. The average household with female land rights owns just over six hectares, 
compared to the overall average of more than thirteen and a half hectares, while they operate less 
than half of the land of the average farm. In addition, the average household with female land 
rights generates one-half of the overall average net farm income (Table 2). Those farms generate 
a little over half the average net farm income per capita, but in terms of net farm income per 
hectare, farms with female land rights generate 162% of the overall average. 
  Why do Paraguayan farms with female land rights have lower farm incomes? One 
possible explanation is that households with female land rights have less land, and so, less 
earning potential. While this is an accurate assessment of the position of households with female 
land rights in Paraguay, the regression analysis in the World Bank report controlled for the 
amount of both land and other assets by households, implying that the amount of land is not the 
only issue. Another possible explanation is that households with female land rights are less 
productive, the opposite of what Agarwal claims. This possibility seems unlikely, at least at first 
glance, given the higher land productivity for households with female land rights reported in 
Table 2. A third explanation is that households with female land rights use land differently, 
either in terms of the mix of farm production (agriculture versus animal husbandry), in terms of 
crop mix, in terms of the objective of production (food versus cash), or a combination of some or 
all of these differences. 
  This article explores these possibilities by relating crop specialization, crop yields, and 
productivity to measures of women’s rights to land. I test the hypothesis that productivity 
differences cannot account for lower farm incomes for households with women’s land rights. In 
order to do this, I look for gendered cropping patterns and related efficiency differences. I also 
examine the impact of women’s land rights on both crop yields and general agricultural 
productivity. If households with female land rights have higher yields or productivity, or if there 
is no significant difference between households with and without female land rights, this rules 
out the productivity explanation of lower farm income, at least in the case of Paraguay. Finding   5
that households with female land rights have higher yields or productivity would lend empirical 
support to Agarwal’s second point. This article adds to the emerging picture we have of asset 
ownership’s impact on women in the less-developed countries. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on the intersection of gender and agricultural productivity is large and growing. I 
attempt to summarize its main points as they apply to the subject at hand. First, I consider those 
studies relating to the impact of gender relations on the availability of inputs (including assets 
and assistance) to agricultural households. Second, I review those works that attempt to model 
and/or quantify the effects of gender on the agricultural household production process and on 
agricultural output. Third, I briefly discuss two crucial methodological aspects of assessing the 
effect of women’s land rights on agricultural productivity: measuring women’s land rights and 
measuring productivity. 
  There is a wide body of literature focusing on the impacts of gender discrimination on 
women’s access to resources in general and to inputs into agricultural production. The most 
important resource is land, of course, but other notable examples are education, credit, and 
technical assistance. Women’s ability to obtain agricultural inputs is also directly constrained by 
gender discrimination, but the indirect effect that differential access to resources (especially 
credit) has on women’s ability to obtain inputs for production may be equally, if not more, 
important. 
  Women are much less likely to own land in much of the world. Latin America is no 
exception. Studies tell us that in Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru (Deere and León 2003), as 
well as El Salvador (Lastarría-Cornhiel 1988), women are in the minority of landowners. In the 
sample for this article, 12% of households had women landowners (see Table 1). Deere and León 
(2003) study the sources and incidence of land ownership by women throughout Latin America. 
They find that men are more likely to acquire land through markets. Due to gender bias in land 
markets (and imperfect markets for credit and labor), women are less competitive in the land 
market. Thus, women are more likely to inherit their land than buy it. Though the institutional 
situation of women is improving both within and outside of marriage throughout Latin America, 
land is increasingly concentrated and the land market is increasingly important in gaining access   6
to land, so a wait-and-see attitude towards women’s land rights is inadequate to address the 
unequal distribution of land. “Human capital” also seems to be unequally distributed between 
men and women. There has been a pattern of women receiving less education (Moock 1976) and 
extension services may be biased towards men (Moock 1976; Doss 2001). Indeed, the types of 
technologies developed may be biased towards male tasks (Doss 2001). 
  Agarwal (1994), and Deere and León (2001) define effective women’s land rights as 
requiring legal ownership of land by women, societal recognition of that ownership, and 
effective control by women over land that they own. This definition is comprehensive and 
reflects an awareness of the many nuances of present-day gender relations throughout the world. 
As such, this definition of women’s land rights imposes strong information requirements on 
those who wish to employ a meaningful measure of women’s and rights in an empirical 
investigation. 
  Unfortunately, data collection has yet to completely catch up with these requirements and 
studies to date have needed to use less satisfactory measures to assess the impacts of gender. 
Quisumbing (1996) critiques the methodology of studies of gender differences in productivity 
and reviews their findings. Most studies of gender and productivity use female household 
headship as an explanatory variable (Lastarría-Cornhiel 1988; Jacoby 1992). But this focus on 
headship has several problems. First, it obscures the real issues—who has ownership of the land 
and who has actual decision-making power in the production process (not necessarily the 
household head in either case). Second, female household headship is endogenous, a product of 
the marriage market and marriage dissolution (Quisumbing 1996). The best information to have 
would be detailed plot-level information about ownership and decision making in agricultural 
households. Without this information, we are left to make inferences about farm management, 
for example, using the amount of time spent in farming activities as an indicator of individuals’ 
decision-making influence (Deere et al. 2005). 
  Moving to the literature on gender effects on agricultural production, we can identify two 
main themes. The first focuses on the effects of gender on the allocation of resources among 
household members. The second examines differences between men and women farmers. I 
review each theme in turn.  
  Departing from the relatively old-fashioned, unitary model of the household (in which the 
household is modeled as though it were an individual maximizing its utility, leaving no room for   7
differential resource preferences and allocation) allows richer explanations of household 
behavior. Bargaining models attempt to reflect the resolution of conflicting priorities among 
members with differing power within households. Many of the early models assumed that the 
outcomes of these processes were Pareto efficient. However, there is ample evidence that 
outcomes do not achieve even Pareto efficiency. One of the more obvious examples is the 
incidence of violence among household members, usually aimed at relatively (usually 
physically) weaker members, often women and children. Also, empirical studies of farm 
household outcomes have yielded evidence of inefficient allocation of resources along gender 
lines, and to the detriment of women (Tibaijuka 1994; Udry et al. 1995; Udry 1996). Thus, more 
recent examinations of household behavior have focused on decisions about resource allocation. 
Some of these models attempt to determine how decisions are made, while others examine the 
effects of decisions on production. 
  Most of the empirical work on intrahousehold gender effects on production has been on 
Africa, since in that context, men and women commonly have their own plots to farm. In Latin 
America, where family farming is the predominant mode of farm organization, such studies are 
much harder to carry out. African cases studies have found evidence that resources are allocated 
inefficiently based on gender (Udry et al. 1995; Udry 1996). Others have quantified the costs in 
lost production due to gender-related misallocation of resources (Tibaijuka 1994). Thus, the 
standard models of household production (including cooperative bargaining models) that assume 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources within households are not adequate for capturing the 
gender dynamics of resource allocation within households. 
  Studies addressing gender differences in production itself include attempts to measure 
both differences between men and women, and the costs of gender-related inefficiencies in 
agricultural production. Reviewing the results in the literature, Quisumbing (1996) notes that the 
literature itself is biased towards finding differences between men and women, since those 
studies finding differences are more likely to be submitted and published. Nevertheless, the 
studies she reviews find no significant differences in technical efficiency between male and 
female heads or managers, though there may be some evidence for differences in allocative 
efficiency. Attempts to quantify differences between men and women have employed various 
measures of farming ability. Land productivity, that is, total output (usually aggregated with 
prices) divided by size of farm, is one of the most frequently used measures (Lastarría-Cornhiel   8
1988). Labor productivity (Jacoby 1992) and crop yield (Moock 1976), frequently combined 
with an analysis of crop specialization (Moock 1976; Doss 2002), are two more oft-used 
measures. Moock found that women had higher yields of corn per hectare (what Moock calls 
technical efficiency) than men. Jacoby (1992) finds that women contribute more to livestock 
production and men contribute more to crop production. Doss (2002) concludes that in Ghana it 
is not possible to divide individual crops into men’s and women’s crops. However, she does find 
that gender-based cropping patterns exist, and so cautions that agricultural policy cannot be 
considered gender neutral. For example, female-headed households are more likely to be affected 
by staple crop policies than women in male-headed households. 
  A great deal of literature has been devoted to the measurement of agricultural 
productivity (see Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995, for a full discussion). I limit my 
comments here to the additional insights that a focus on gender lends us. A problem with all of 
the studies reviewed by Quisumbing is that household work, which women are more likely to do, 
is not valued. If this work is productive, in the sense of creating marketable value (i.e., 
processing agricultural products), neglecting it implies bias against women in productivity 
measurements. More generally, all of the studies neglect the endogeneity of input choices, 
leading to biased coefficients (Quisumbing 1996). Unless we have detailed data on household 
work performed and a consistent way to assign value to it, problems arise for our analysis. First, 
any measure of total household production is biased downward. This bias may not be a problem 
if it is randomly distributed among households, however, it is likely that this bias will be larger 
for female-headed households. The second problem that arises is that the size of this bias will be 
inversely related to household size, since in smaller households, uncounted household production 
is a greater share of total household production to the extent that there are economies of scale in 
household production. Third, since women are likely to provide the majority of household 
production, women’s contribution to total production is consistently underestimated. Fourth, to 
the extent that women’s production is in areas that are less easily valued (such as food crop 
production), that labor is again likely to be undervalued, since staple crop returns will tend to be 
lower than cash crop returns. These problems, taken together, mean that the measurement of total 
agricultural household production is biased against female-headed and small (in terms of farm 
size) households. 
  To sum up, we can make several observations on the literature relating agricultural   9
productivity and gender. First, the question of how best to quantify gender itself is crucial. 
Detailed data on decision-making power at the plot level within agricultural households is 
needed to do so. Second, the production of women is likely to be understated, to the extent that 
women perform unpaid and uncounted household labor. In order to alleviate this problem, 
detailed information on all the household production activities of women and men is needed. 
Third, women are likely to have less access to a variety of resources, especially land, which 
constrains their ability to produce efficiently. Fourth, within households, women’s productive 
activities are likely to be handicapped by resource allocation decisions that are biased towards 
male activities. In order to account for all of these phenomena and to address these issues, more 
and better information is required. While progress in data collection has been made, there is still 
far to go. Further work in this area is clearly needed, in Latin America and elsewhere. This 
article contributes an analysis of the impact of gender on crop specialization, crop yields, and 
productivity. While this is a step forward, previous work makes it clear that more cross-country 
studies are needed, since context is crucial in all of these issues (Deere et al. 2005). 
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
 
The literature makes clear the need for good information on the inner workings of households. 
Unfortunately, it is still the case in Paraguay, as elsewhere, that the sort of detailed information 
needed to isolate the impacts of gender on production and welfare in rural households is largely 
lacking. I use the MECOVI Living Standards Measurement Survey, designed according to the 
World Bank standard for this type of survey, and conducted over the course of one year between 
September 2000 and August 2001, by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería. This is the first 
survey completed in Paraguay that has data on ownership of land by individuals. Thus, this is the 
first time we can assess the impact of women’s land rights directly. The data set does have 
limitations, however. Data on individual ownership is available only at the household level. Plot-
level data on ownership, which would be ideal, is not available. The survey includes relatively 
detailed information on economic activity by individual, but not on the crucial question of who 
makes the decisions. This means that I will not be able to assess the impact of female land rights 
in the full sense of the definition given by Agarwal—I have no way to determine independent 
control over land. Thus, this article, while a step ahead of many past attempts to link female land   10
rights with productivity, will suffer from many of the problems of interpretation of previous 
work in this vein.  
  What measure of productivity to use is certainly an open question. Most studies have 
used land productivity (aggregate output divided by farm size). But this measure is subject to 
criticism as giving too much importance to one input, land. Binswanger, Deninger, and Feder 
(1995) suggest the use of the following specification for testing the farm-size productivity 
relationship: 
 
                                    P/K = g(OP,OW,H,Z)                                                       (1) 
 
where P is profits net of family labor costs, K is assets, OP is operational holdings, OW is owned 
land, H is the number of household workers, and Z is a vector of exogenous variables (such as 
land quality, etc.). However, the question of how to value family labor costs is left open. In this 
case, since there is little opportunity for alternative employment in the Paraguayan rural sector, I 
assume that the opportunity cost of family labor is negligible. 
  I measure women’s land rights based on whether or not a female in the household has 
title to land.
2 Crop yields are measured using the total harvested value divided by cropped area 
for each crop. For productivity I use both land productivity (the net farm income divided by the 
operational area of the farm) and rate of return (the net farm income divided by the total value of 
farm assets).  
  Since I will not be using a production function approach, functional form is not an issue 
at present, as with many other studies (Quisumbing 1996). I use linear and log-linear models to 
estimate the relationship between the crop yield and productivity variables, and female land 
rights. I will also include as explanatory variables various household, farm, and regional 
characteristics. The household characteristics include: the sexes of single household heads, the 
age and education of the household head(s), household size, and the number of adult members. 
The farm characteristics I use as explanatory variables include the size of both ownership and 
operational holdings. The regional characteristics include the zone in which the farm is located 
                                                 
2 This includes cases in which women alone own land, in which both women and men own land individually, or in 
which women own land jointly with men.   11
and an index of soil quality for the district in which each farm is located.
3 
 
4. FARM INCOME 
 
First, consider the demographics of the gender variables among farm households in this survey.
4 
Of the 1,837 rural owner-operated farm households in this survey, 76.9% were dual-headed, 
14.5% were female-headed, and 8.6% were male headed (see Table 1).
5 Of these owner-operated 
farm households, households with male owners make up the largest number, 41.1% of the total. 
Female owners are in 10.6% of households, with joint ownership characterizing only 1.4% of 
households. Thus, only 221, or 12%, have some female land rights. Note that 861 households 
(46.8%) either did not have title to land or the titleholder was a nonmember, so nothing is known 
about the identity of the owner. Thus, while only 12% of households had some female land 
rights, 22.6% of households with known title-holders did. For each of the gender categories, 
women own and operate significantly less land and men own and operate more land. For the rest 
of this analysis, I use sex of household heads and female land rights.
6 
  Previous work showed that in Paraguay, female land rights significantly reduced net farm 
income (Deere et al. 2005). I now examine net farm income, net farm income per hectare, and 
the shares of gross farm income from each of its four components (crop, cattle, dairy, and 
processed; see Table 2).
7 I use generalized linear regression to test for significant differences in 
                                                 
3 This index is a weighted average of soil quality based on soil types found in each district, from information given 
to me by the Minsterio de Agricultrura y Ganadería (MAG). 
4 Due to the use of survey weights and rounding in generating tables and statistics, frequencies may not add up to the 
totals and percentages may not add to 100%. 
5 By dual-headed households, I simply mean those households in which a male and female pair of adults is present. 
In the survey, these household members are listed as Jefe/a and Esposo/a/compañero/a. I make no assumptions about 
which of the two is the “head” in the household. No households listed same-sex pairs of adult heads. Female headed 
and male-headed households are those in which only one person from these two categories is present. 
6 Earlier versions used the expanded ownership categories, but these did not add much explanatory power. 
7 Net farm income here means the total value of farm production valued at market prices (gross farm income) minus 
all the costs of production, including family labor, also valued at market prices. In 2000, the exchange rate for 
Guaranies (hereafter, simply G) averaged about 3,685 G per U.S. dollar, so one million G is roughly equivalent to 
$271 U.S. in 2000. Crop income includes the value of all crops harvested minus crops processed; cattle income 
includes all livestock sold or eaten plus livestock growth (assumed to be 10%); “dairy” income includes all milk, 
eggs, honey, and rawhide produced minus processed; and processed income includes total value of all starch, corn 
flour, marmalade, cane honey, soy milk, cotton thread, cheese, cold cuts, lumber, firewood, charcoal, wooden posts, 
and essence of Petit Grain produced minus the value of the crops and dairy products processed.   12
means by gender.
8 For this section’s discussion, income is defined as net farm income, income 
per capita is defined as net farm income per household member, and income per hectare is 
defined as net farm income per hectare of land operated (farm size). While the average income 
for all households in the sample is 6.519 million G, the average income per hectare is 1.689 
million G. Households received the largest part of their gross income, 38.53%, from crops, with 
dairy coming second at 33.58%, and cattle third at 20.48%. The revenue from processed goods 
was the smallest share at 7.41%. 
  Those households with female heads have significantly lower average income and dual-
headed households have significantly higher average income than the sample average, with the 
average income for female-headed households being less than half the overall average. Female-
headed households earn significantly less in terms of per capita income as well. Female-headed 
households get a significantly larger share of their gross income from dairy and a significantly 
smaller share from crops. Households with female land rights have significantly lower income 
and income per capita, but higher income per hectare. In addition, households with female land 
rights receive significantly more of their income from dairy production and significantly less 
from crops and processing.  
  So, while farms with female land rights do have lower incomes, they have higher income 
per hectare. This phenomenon is apparently explained by recalling the differences in land 
holdings among the various gender categories: households with female land rights, female 
management, and female household heads all own and operate significantly less land. The prior 
study controlled for the size of farm, which we found to increase income significantly (Deere et 
al. 2005), and still found lower agricultural income for households with female land rights. So 
while women’s lack of access to land is a part of the explanation for lower incomes, it is not the 
whole story. 
  In summary, we can now identify gendered patterns to rural farm production in Paraguay. 
Households with female heads and female ownership receive less income and more income per 
hectare than other farms. These same households get more of their farm revenue from dairy 
                                                 
8 For example, testing the difference of means of the net farm income by the household head, I run a generalized 
linear regression of the following model:  
                net farm income = β1female_head + β2male_head.                                (2) 
If β1 or β2 are significantly different from zero, I say that female-headed or male-headed households receive 
significantly different net farm incomes from dual-headed households, the default category. 
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production and less from crop production. Is there an economic rationale for these patterns? In 
order to further explore the impact of gender on farm households, I investigate differences in 
crop yields and gender crop specialization, before moving on to attempt to explain differences in 
income per hectare and in the rate of return based on Equation 1, above. 
 
5. CROP SPECIALIZATION AND CROP YIELDS 
 
What, if any, cropping differences are there between men and women? To investigate crop 
specialization, I examined cropping patterns by household head, female land rights, and female 
management. This is an attempt to identify “women’s” and “men’s” crops. I could then test those 
crop’s yields on the gender variables to see if women have a productivity advantage in women’s 
crops and vice versa. I first studied individual crops, ordering crops by the number of farms 
growing them and by the area sown to each. I then examined the incidence of each of these with 
the household headship and female land rights. However, no significant differences by gender 
appear at the level of individual crops among farms. By looking at the uses of each crop, I am 
able to distinguish between two categories of crops—cash crops and food crops. I define cash 
crops as those of which farmers sell more than half of their harvest.
9 In addition, 80% of the 
harvested weight of sugar cane goes to cattle feed, but that is what’s left after processing the cane 
for sugar production, most of which is sold. Thus, I categorize sugar cane as a cash crop. Food 
crops are those crops of which farmers eat more than half of their harvest.
10 Almost all Chipá 
corn is processed into corn flour (used to make the delicious bread, also called Chipá). Farm 
households consume most of this flour, so I categorize Chipá as a food crop. Other crops were 
split among processing, cattle feed, cash, and consumption. In each of these cases, by dividing 
the portions going to the other uses into the proportions of each use that goes to consumption and 
sales in the end, I am able to classify these “mixed use” crops into cash crops
11 and food crops.
12 
This accounts for almost all of the crop production in the country, whether measured by area 
                                                 
9 These include cotton, soy, wheat, Tupí corn, tobacco, irrigated rice, onion, sunflower, mint, pumpkin, cantaloupe, 
watermelon, castor, peas, eggplant, snap beans, Lima beans (Poroto Manteca), sesame, tomato, peppers, carrots, 
cabbage, cucumber, beets, Swiss chard, celery, watercress, green onions, parsley, turnip, coffee, sour orange, 
pineapple, tung, Yerba Mate, papaya, and mandarin orange. 
10 These crops include peanuts, Lima beans (Poroto), potato, dry bean, unirrigated rice, garlic, strawberry, lettuce, 
radish, banana, grape, avocado, guava, lemon, sweet orange, and Shadduck. 
11 Squash, sorghum, other corn, and mango.   14
sown or harvested value.  
  I now examine the incidence of each type of crop, the area sown to each type, the 
harvested value of each type, and the value harvested per hectare (yield) for each type, all broken 
down by the gender variables. Here I use chi-square tests to check significance for incidence, and 
a generalized linear regression to test for significant differences in means.
13 Female-headed 
households and households with female land rights are both less likely than the sample 
population as a whole to sow both food and cash crops (Table 3). Female-headed households 
sow significantly less land to food and cash crops, while dual-headed households sow 
significantly more land to food crops. For food crops there are, however, no significant 
differences in the share of land sown over households with different kinds of heads. Finally, 
male-headed households sow significantly more land to cash crops and overall (remember that 
male headed households own and operate three times as much land as female-headed 
households). The same comparisons over the presence of female land rights yield significant 
results across the board: less land sown to food crops, cash crops, and all crops, and a smaller 
share of land to food crops and to cash crops. 
  In terms of harvested value and yields, the patterns repeat (Table 4). Female-headed 
households get significantly smaller harvests in value terms in both cash and food crops. Dual-
headed households have significantly higher cash crop harvests. These results follow from the 
differences in farm size and area sown reported above. None of the differences in yields are 
significant, but female-headed and male-headed households’ food crop yields were lower than 
cash crop yields, while for dual-headed households the opposite was true. Again, female land 
rights generated significant differences in all the categories other than yields, with those 
households with female land rights getting smaller-value harvests and a lower share of harvested 
value. 
  Looking at the overall picture, we can identify clear patterns along gender lines. Though 
female household heads and owners all sow less area and get less income from crops of either 
type and overall, as we have seen, this is mainly due to the fact that their farms are much 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Sweet potato, manioc. 
13 For example, testing the difference of means of the area sown to each type of crop by the household head, I ran a 
generalized linear regression of the following model: 
                       net_farm_income = β1female_head + β2male_head                                                   (3) 
if β1 or β2 are significantly different from zero, I say that female-headed or male-headed households receive 
significantly different net farm income than dual-headed households, the default category.   15
smaller—there is no evidence of significant differences in yields. Although female-headed 
households and households with female land rights sow more of their land in and get more of 
their harvested value from food crops, so do all other households. For other households this is 
not unusual—they get higher yields in food crops. But female-headed households and 
households with female land rights have higher average yields in cash crops than food crops. 
Economic rationality would lead farmers to specialize in the area they are most efficient. All else 
equal, female-headed households and households with female land rights should then specialize 
in cash crops. Of course, it may be that the difference in average yields is not caused by gender. I 
will now attempt to explain differences in crop yields. In this case, the dependent variable is food 
crop yield and cash crop yield, where yield is total harvested value divided by area sown to each 
type of crop. The model I estimate is: 
 
          Yield = β1FLR + β2female_head + β3male_ head 
          + β4FemaleYears + β5FemaleAge + β6MaleYears 
          + β7MaleAge + β8AreaOw + β9AreaOp + β10Capital 
         + β11numadult + β12hhsize + β13soil_quality 
          + β14central + β15colonizacion + β16frontera 
 
 




where FLR is the female land rights dummy variable, which is one for each household in which a 
woman holds title to land. Female_head and Male_head are the dummy variables for the sex of 
single household heads. FemaleYears is the number of years of education the female head 
received and FemaleAge is the age of the female head. MaleYears is the number of years of 
education received by the male head and MaleAge is the age of the male head. CroppedArea is 
the total area cultivated by the household, in hectares. AreaOw is the total area owned by the 
household, in hectares. NoTitle is a dummy variable taking the value one for households that 
own land without title. AreaOp is the total operational holdings, or farm size, in hectares. I 
include both farm size and area owned in order to differentiate the effect of how much land a 
household owns (the effect of property ownership) and how big a farm they have (the effect of 
the scale of operations). Capital is the value of productive assets owned by the household, in 
millions of G. Numadult is the number of adults in the household and hhsize is the total number 
of people in the household. The soil_quality variable is the index of soil quality for the   16
household’s district. Tech_ass_recvd and cred_ass_recvd are the dummy variables signifying 
that a household received technical or credit assistance, respectively. Central, colonizacion, and 
frontera are regional dummy variables (chaco was dropped in all cases due to multicollinearity). 
Summary statistics for regression variables are presented in Table 5. For each crop, I test for 
multicollinearity using variance inflation factors and drop problematic variables from the model. 
I run the same specification for each crop (log of crop yield regressed on the log of the 
continuous independent variables) using the survey regression procedure. The regression results 
are presented in Table 6. 
  The regressions for these two crop yield variables could explain relatively little of their 
variation (R
2 for both food yield and cash yield was .04). In both cases, though, the F-statistic 
was significant at the 1% level. None of the estimated coefficients for the gender variables were 
significantly different from zero, though the signs for female land rights were positive and those 
for female heads were negative. In addition, the size of the marginal effect
14 of female land rights 
is small in both cases, while the effect of female headship on cash crop yields is larger. Food 
crop yields were significantly smaller with smaller farm sizes and greater with better soil quality 
(the largest marginal effect). Every region had significantly lower food crop yields than the 
minifundia region. To summarize the results thus far, we have seen that where women hold 
positions of greater importance in rural Paraguayan farm households (whether the head or a land 
owner), the emphasis in production is on food rather than cash crops. But as yet, no solid 
evidence of gender differentiation in crop yields, either for specific crops or for type of crops, is 
apparent. Next, I attempt to determine if differences in overall productivity can explain lower 








   17
6. PRODUCTIVITY 
 
I use two measures of productivity in this section. The first, land productivity (LP), is simply the 
total value of all agricultural production, net of costs, divided by the farm size (operated area). 
The second measure, the rate of return on assets (P_K), is similar except that the denominator in 
this case is total farm assets (land owned, capital equipment, etc.; see Equation 1, above). I 
regress each variable using the following specification:  
 
Productivity = β1FLR + β2female_head + β3male_head 
          + β4FemaleYears + β5FemaleAge + β6MaleYears 
                            + β7MaleAge + β8AreaOp + β9Capital                     (3)                
          + β10numadult + β11hhsize + β12soil_quality 
          + β13central + β14colonizacion + β15frontera. 
 
For both dependent variables, the log-log model was the best fit. However, since net farm 
revenue is negative for many of the farms in the sample, we have a selection problem (the log of 
a nonpositive number is undefined).
15 This introduces selection bias, which leads to artificially 
low standard errors if we use ordinary least squares regression analysis. This bias is addressed by 
using the Heckman two-step estimation procedure. This procedure follows Heckman (1979) by 
first performing a probit estimation using a dummy variable, LPos, for the land productivity 
regression and PPos for the rate of return regression, that takes the value of one if the land 
productivity or the rate of return are negative, respectively. The probit step uses different 
independent variables than those in Equation 3, above (region, soil_quality, LandValue, 
MaleYears, FemaleYears). The results of this estimation are then used in the second step to 
obtain consistent estimates for the coefficients of the independent variables (see Table 6). 
  First, notice that female land rights are estimated to significantly reduce return on assets, 
but not land productivity. Male experience leads to significantly higher rates of return. Farm size 
follows the stylized facts of the inverse relationship literature—it significantly decreases land 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Since this regression is log-log, the marginal effects are equivalent to the regression coefficients. 
15 The model I estimate for land productivity does not include AreaOw because testing for multicollinearity using 
variance inflation factors revealed that using area owned in this model was a problem.   18
productivity and significantly increases rates of return. The amount of assets is also estimated to 
significantly increase land productivity. Curiously, while higher soil quality is estimated to 
significantly increase land productivity, it is also estimated to significantly decrease the rate of 
return. Finally, farms in the central region have significantly lower rates of return on assets, 
while those in the colonization region have significantly higher land productivity. 
  So, in addition to lower net farm incomes, households with female land rights tend to 
have lower net farm incomes per hectare and rates of return on assets. Since I control for both 
land and capital equipment in the regressions, it is clearly not a matter of access to those 




What we see then is more evidence that rural Paraguayan households with female land rights are 
somehow disadvantaged in terms of agricultural income, but the explanation remains elusive. We 
have seen that Paraguayan women and men have distinct patterns of agricultural production. 
Women concentrate more on livestock and associated byproducts, while men are more likely to 
cultivate crops. Still, if women were less efficient farmers, this could explain the disadvantage 
they have, despite the fact that they get less of their farm income from crops than men. However, 
there is no evidence to support that claim. There are, again, distinct patterns of cropping: women 
clearly emphasize food crops, and men grow more cash crops. However, there are still no 
significant differences between women and men in terms of cash or food crop yields. In terms of 
the land productivity and rate of return measures, households with female land rights do 
significantly worse in rates of return, but more than this we cannot say. So something related to 
ownership of land is a barrier to women getting higher incomes from farm activities, but lower 
proficiency at farming is not the explanation. Perhaps lack of control over land rather than its 
ownership is the cause of the disparity in incomes.  
  Given these results, two avenues present themselves for further exploration. First, a study 
of animal husbandry is clearly needed to understand the disadvantage women appear to have 
in the Paraguayan rural sector. Such an examination will tell us, for example, if a more efficient 
distribution of resources would be women doing the cattle raising and men doing the cultivation. 
In addition, a better idea of women’s actual control over allocating resources (including their   19
own labor) is essential in order to understand the dynamics at work. More comprehensive data 
will help to tell more of the story. My measure of female management is, for the most part, a 
measure of relative female participation in agricultural production, and my measure of female 
land rights is a measure of the presence of female ownership, rather than a measure of effective 
rights (which would include direct control over land). Thus, while definite progress has been 
made in gathering data about gender in Paraguayan households, there is still room for 
improvement. Helpful extensions to data-gathering efforts include information about ownership 
by plot, information about decision-making by activity and plot, and more detailed information 
about production costs and their allocation among different activities and plots.   20
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Number, Average Farm Size, and Area Owned of Owner-Operated Farms by 
Household Head, Land Owner, and Female Land Rights 







Female  267 14.5%  8.287**  6.841** 
Male  158 8.6%  27.672  24.199 
Dual  1412 76.9%  16.786  13.630 
 
Land Owner 
Female  195 10.6%  7.217*  5.455** 
Male  755 41.1%  26.132*  22.684† 
Joint  26 1.4%  15.321** 14.803** 
Nonmember  155 8.4%  9.875**  8.502** 
No Title  706 38.4%  10.616  7.461 
 
Female Land Rights 
Some   221 12.0%  7.794**  6.121** 
None  1616 88.0%  17.987** 14.843** 
       
Total  1837 100.0%  16.556  13.618 
 
Source: MECOVI 2001 
Significance levels: † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Significance was tested using a generalized linear regression of the variable on dummy variables representing the different categories. 
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Table 2: Average Net Farm Income (millions G) by Source, Household Head, and Female 


































mean  2.997** 0.895**  3.674  23.63%** 23.91%  45.97%**  6.36%  Female 
median  1.560 0.447  0.716  12.00%  17.16%  46.80%  0.00% 
mean  4.867 2.895  4.028  44.22%  22.54%  27.88%  5.18%  Male 
median  3.127 1.163  0.520  46.90%  8.79%  16.82%  0.00% 
mean  7.388** 1.695  3.163  40.61%* 19.55%  31.86%  7.86%  Dual 
median  3.616 0.621  0.733  40.60%  12.37%  22.86%  1.40% 
 
Female Land Rights 
mean  3.253** 0.966** 5.374*  21.42%** 23.38%  50.00%**  5.20%*  Some 
median  1.413 0.445  0.992  5.81%  14.44%  46.80%  0.00% 
mean  7.053** 1.808** 2.980*  41.27%** 19.98%  30.85%**  7.76%*  None 
median  3.538 0.664  0.674  40.69%  11.88%  22.32%  1.26% 
               
mean  6.519 1.689  3.317  38.48%  20.46%  33.54%  7.40%  Total 
median  3.113 0.613  0.706  35.76%  12.52%  24.19%  0.64% 
 
 
Source: MECOVI 2001 
Significance levels: † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Significance was tested using a survey linear regression of the variable on dummy variables representing the different 
categories.   22
Table 3: Area Sown and Share of Total Area Sown by Crop Type, Household Head, and 
Female Land Rights 
   Food Crops  Cash Crops  Total 























mean  57.93%**  0.979**  33.87% 53.50%*  1.665* 26.88%** 2.644*  Female 
median  100.00% 0.650  23.81%  100.00% 0.500  7.94%  1.220 
mean  79.48%  1.391  43.20% 74.85% 19.091 38.76% 20.482  Male 
median  100.00%  1.100 45.47%  100.00%  1.315 40.00% 2.655 
mean  78.51%†  1.434* 39.48% 72.80%  7.959 41.91%* 9.393  Dual 
median  100.00%  1.220 37.24%  100.00%  1.577 46.02% 3.013 
 
Female Land Rights 
mean  54.56%**  0.904** 30.33%*  47.69%** 2.391† 25.65%** 3.295*  Some 
median  100.00%  0.610 4.99% 0.00% 0.520 0.00% 1.625 
mean  79.06%** 1.432**  40.42%* 73.87%** 8.983†  41.70%** 10.415*  None 
median  100.00%  1.195 38.42%  100.00%  1.502 45.05% 3.000 
           
mean  75.62% 1.379 39.00%  70.19% 8.323 39.44% 9.702  Total 




Source: MECOVI 2001 
Significance levels: † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Significance was tested using a linear regression of the variable on dummy variables representing the different categories.   23
Table 4: Crop Value, Share of Total Crop Value, and Crop Yield by Crop Type and 
Household Head, Household Head and Female Land Rights 
   Food Crops  Cash Crops  Total 
































mean  0.953**  37.82% 2.067 1.048**  22.93%** 5.429 3.293** 5.072  Female 
median  0.166  33.01%  1.425 0.024 4.75% 0.800 1.422 1.011 
mean  1.571 43.54% 1.878 18.582  38.42% 2.435 24.590 1.945  Male 
median  0.730  37.99%  1.192 0.516  38.44%  0.960 2.694 1.235 
mean  1.934**  44.40%  3.823  7.195 36.76%† 2.347  11.218  3.578  Dual 
median  0.980  43.84%  1.434 0.816  31.16%  0.954 3.683 1.194 
 
Female Land Rights 
mean  0.872**  33.68%*  2.488 1.367*  22.30%** 5.972 4.001* 5.458  Some 
median  0.077 6.90% 1.625 0.000 0.00% 1.080 1.970 1.193 
mean  1.904** 44.95%*  3.546  8.330* 36.96%** 2.350  12.462*  3.380  None 
median  0.963  44.00%  1.374 0.750  31.47%  0.936 3.329 1.189 
            
mean  1.759 43.36% 3.439  7.352 34.90% 2.696 11.614 3.588  Total 




Source: MECOVI 2001 
Significance levels: † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Significance was tested using a survey regression of the variable on dummy variables representing the different categories.   24
Table 5:  Summary Statistics for Regression Variables 
  Mean 
Linearized 
Std. Errors  N 
Food Crop Yield (Millions G/Ha.)  3.439 1.265 1511 
Cash Crop Yield (Millions G/Ha.)  2.696 0.499 1443 
Land Productivity (Millions G/Ha.)  3.317 0.564 1835 
Net Farm Profits Divided by Assets  0.813 0.097 1837 
Female Land Rights (%)  14.042 1.446  1837 
Female-only Head (%)  14.498 1.613  1837 
Male-only Head (%)  9.203 1.332 1837 
Years of Experience, Female Head  37.650 0.697  1679 
Years of Experience, Male Head  40.845 0.843  1570 
Area Owned (Ha.)  13.618 2.348  1837 
Area Operated (Ha.)  16.556 2.538  1837 
Capital Eq. (millions G)  11.963 2.424  1837 
Number of Adults in Household  2.741 0.052 1837 
Size of Household  5.246 0.115 1837 
Soil Quality Index (0 - worst; 1 - best)  0.412 0.018 1763 
Central Region (%)  36.437 5.381  1837 
Minifundia Region (%)  13.379 1.957  1837 
Colonization Region (%)  22.604 3.595  1837 
Frontier Region (%)  26.324 3.817  1837 




Source: MECOVI 2001 
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Female Land Rights  0.01 0.056  -0.025  -0.653 
  (0.159) (0.172) (0.129)  (0.217)** 
female_head  -0.017 -0.197 -0.28  0.524 
  (0.157) (0.18) (0.177)  (0.394) 
male_head  0.023 -0.058 0.26  0.298 
  (0.145) (0.148) (0.215)  (0.205) 
logFemaleExp  0.095 -0.107  -0.006  -0.019 
  (0.153) (0.141) (0.167)  (0.248) 
logMaleExp  0.051 -0.238  -0.162  0.558 
  (0.16) (0.161)  (0.208)  (0.247)* 
logAreaOW  -0.02 0.006     
  (0.04) (0.071)     
logAreaOP  -0.134 -0.065 -0.692  0.613 
  (0.053)* (0.068)  (0.047)**  (0.094)** 
logCapital  0.087 -0.006 0.216  -0.113 
  (0.030)** (0.067) (0.042)**  (0.099) 
Number of Adults in Household  0.014 0.063  -0.003  -0.131 
  (0.036) (0.049) (0.033)  (0.053)* 
Size of Household  0.006 -0.037 0.047  0.141 
  (0.017) (0.023)  (0.014)**  (0.037)** 
Soil Quality Index (0 - worst; 1 - best)  0.583 0.11 0.281  -0.999 
  (0.195)** (0.227) (0.148)†  (0.399)* 
central  -0.298 0.269 -0.112  -1.043 
  (0.097)** (0.165)  (0.109)  (0.267)** 
colonizacion  -0.226 -0.137 0.139  0.195 
  (0.117)† (0.106) (0.082)†  (0.131) 
frontera  -0.301 -0.009 0.136  0.194 
  (0.117)* (0.151) (0.098)  (0.202) 
Observations  1473 1412 1763  1763 





Source: MECOVI 2001 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses        
† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
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